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ABSTRACT 
Energy Analysis of Flat Water Recreation : 
An Economic Assessment 
by 
Craig Leon Howell , Master of Science 
Utah State University , 1984 
Major Professor: Dr . E . Bruce Godfrey 
Department : Economics 
Energy analysts believe that traditional economics and 
energy markets undervalue the only absolutely limited 
resource , ener gy . They have produced methods to supplement 
or supercede economics . 
However, theoretical underpinnings of these methods 
include an energy theory of value which is shown to be too 
narrow to sup port workable economic models or numeraires . 
Sample rankings of recreational values on four Utah 
reservoirs, using energy analysis and economic methods , show 
that the two methods yield opposite rankings. 
(72 pages) 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Economics concerns itself with the efficient allocation 
of resources . It is generally recognized that traditional 
economics may not adequately deal with some problems of 
allocation . Some of those problems include non - market 
goods , externalities , imperfect or restricted markets and 
intergenerational resource allocations (Bator, 1958 , and 
Scitovsky , 1954) . Other disciplines have recognized these 
problems and offered alternative solutions but these may be 
no better than traditional economic solutions. One of the 
alternatives that has been suggested is energy acc ounting or 
energetics. 
In the 1950s, Dr . Howard Odum, a systems ecologist at 
the University of Florida , formulated calculations 
suggest~ng that a research project using algae as an energy 
producer was a net energy consumer because the project was 
kept in operation only through the use of fossil fuels 
purchased with research funds . Odum concluded that energy 
tallies could give a more accurate reading of a project ' s 
feasibility than economics . He subsequently constructed 
engineering schematics for the energy flows in the economy 
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and environment. Other researchers soon joined Odum and 
energy accounting was developed . (Clerk 1974). 
Energy accounting broadens the traditional engineering 
input-outpu~ energy efficiency ratios to include the energy 
inputs and outputs of the system under consideration. As 
represen t ed in Figure 1 which is a simplified schematic 
d~~5ram of energy origin, use and disposal, the accounting 
procedures either ascertain how much energy is available to 
final consumers (net energy --Y-F in Figure 1.) or how much 
in s i tu energy is needed to deliver a given energy to the 
consumer (gross energy-- G-F in Figure 1.) 
F 
Feedback to Keep 
Energy Flowing (F) 
Energy Proces sing ------~y--~ 
System 
Main 
Ec ono my 
Gross Energy (G) l 
Energy 
Sink 
Energy ~----~--~ 
Yield (Y) 1 
Energy 
Sink 
Figure 1 . Schematic representation of energy flows 
with net and gross energy shown 
(Source Odum , 1977) 
Within the last f ew years as public awareness of the 
possibility of energy shortages grew, significant interest 
has been manifested in energetics as a supplement to 
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traditiona l economic analysis. Energy accountants maintain 
that energy accounting delivers crucial information on 
energy scarcities not provided by traditional economic 
methods . Economics with the engineering , medical , 
sociologica l and environmental fields seeks to define the 
costs and efficiencies of resource decisions. The necessary 
data and models satisfactory to all are not easy to obtain 
nor are the correct . policy implications easy to draw . Thus, 
energetics is a significant advancement if more accurate 
information or modeling results from it . Evaluation of 
energetic theo ry and methods is therefore important. An 
economically efficient use of resources will not occur when 
a market does not exist . One of the areas where markets 
often do not exist involves the provision of outdoor 
recreation. As a result, this area provide~ an example that 
can be used to evaluate the failure of a market solution and 
what energetic methods/methodology can add to the existing 
situation. 
Objectives of Study 
In order to obtain a clearer idea of the theoretical 
and practical utility of energetics , I propose to : 
1 ) Evaluate energy analysis and methods from an 
ec onomic point of view; 
2) Estimate recreati on values on the same reservoirs 
using energetic and economic methods ; and 
3) Compare and eval ua te the results obtained in 
procedures 1 and 2 . 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ENERGY ANALYSIS 
Resource Scarcity 
The U. S . conservation movement accepted the classical 
economist's, Ricardo (1966) noti on of absolute resource lim-
its but rejected laissez faire as an efficient means of 
allocating natural resources . Men such as Pinchot and Muir 
argued that government intervention with an eye toward the 
welfare of present and future g enerations could improve on 
the unfettered process of natura l resource markets (P inchot 
191 0). 
The movement was successful in fostering conservation 
legislation during the early 1900s (e . g. , the Parks Act of 
1907 and the CCC of the Roosevelt era) . Concurrently, 
another group , the technocrats (possessin g ,a healthy disre -
spect f or markets ) , developed under the leadership of Howard 
Scott . This group wanted to replace the monetary system 
with energy units. The y argued that economic theory was 
incapable of handling technological change and fluctuations 
in res ource availability . 
Naturalist philosophy, the scarcity doctrine and the 
5 
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technocratic ideology, suffered setbacks up until the late 
1960s and early 1970s because many professionals associated 
with natural resources were influenced by spectacular tech-
nological achievement and embraced the notion that tech -
nology would ameliorate scarcity and environmental difficul-
ties (Smith 1974, and Burt and Cummings 1970). However , 
with the advent of the 1973 oil embargo and other supply 
shocks, natural reso~rce managers began once again to pay 
parti cular attention to exhaustible res ource stocks . 
In fact, many now suggest that world resources cannot 
support continued economic growth for several reasons (Ford 
Foundation 1974) . First , resources are not completely sub -
stitutable for each other . Eighty-two of the ninety- two 
natural elements together comprise less than 1% of the 
earth's crust (Brobst, et al 1973) . Many critical indus -
t rial elements comprise minute fractions. As a result, 
shortages of some critical elements may develop (e . g ., 
chromium) . Meadows , et a l (1972) were perhaps the first 
technologist to use systems analysis techniques to forecast 
the demise of civilization through re source depletion and 
pollution . 
Second, an increasing number of scientists suspect that 
the traditional hypothesis that large quantities of lower 
grade but minable ores are available is false. The tradi -
tional hypothesis is based on a unimodal ore grade 
distribution in which larger amounts of lower grade ores are 
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available as smaller quantities of high grade ores are 
depleted. This situation is depicted in Figure 2 . The new 
hypothesis (see Figure 3) is based on a bimodal ore grade 
distribution in which only the high quality ores under the 
right most curve in Figure 3 are minable . The more abundant 
lower grade ores under the left most curve n Figure 3 wouldn't 
be economically minable . If the new hypothesis is correct , 
minable ores would be exhausted much sooner than has been 
traditionally supposed . 
Amount of 
Element 
r 
I Limit of Minable Ores 
Current Mining 
Ore Grade 
Figure 2 . Traditional hypothesis of ore 
distribution 
Amount of i 
Element 
1 
Limit of Minable Or es 
Ore Grade 
Figure 3 . New hypothesis of ore distribution 
(Source Skinner 1976) 
Third, resource managers have recognized that given 
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fores eeable technology and energy constraints , the earth ' s 
nonrenewable resourceo will be exhausted in finite time if 
extraction rates are positive and nondeclining . 
Resource Misallocation 
Energy accountants assert that economics does not allo -
cate finite resources and pa r ticularly the limiting one 
(ener gy ) correctly (Cook 1975 , Berry and Fels 1973 , Clark 
1974 , Odum 1973 , Slesser 1974 and Hannon 1975) . The comm on 
assumption among these authors ' arguments is that even com -
petitiv e markets are often not energy eff i cient. Many tasks 
could be done at lower energy costs and energy inefficient 
markets should be curtailed . 
For example , Hannon (1975 , p . 96) of the Energy 
Research Group at Urbana , after noting that the relative 
cost of electricity decreased from 1925 - 1975 , said : 
The point is two fold . The cost of electricity has 
failed to represent its importance in the market plac e 
and the situation has grown worse with time. 
Barry Sedlik ( 1979 , p . 30) stated that economists do not 
deal adequately with depletable resources . 
If the price goes up economists say you inc r ease sup-
ply . But , increasing the energy supply is not desir -
a ble because you a re dealing with a nonren ewable com -
modity . 
Others contend that economic market models work well only 
when r es ources are infinite , Bell (1977), or wh en market 
plann i ng horizons are infinite , Berry (1972). 
Empirical evidence is offered. The studies of Berry 
and Fels (1973), Hannon (1975) and Pimentel, et al (1975) 
show that significant energy savings could be realized in 
the production of goods ranging from cars to crops . The 
concept shared by these researchers is that economics 
ignores energy constraints and therefore results in an 
inefficient allocation of energy resources . 
In summary, the energetic view is that economics is 
penny-w ise and energy- foolish -- the ultimate long - run 
foolishness . Thus , some energetic researchers suggest that 
an energy theory of value be used to allocate energy 
resources. 
The Energy Theory of Value 
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The energy theory of value holds that energy is the 
sole limiting production factor . Life exists on a slope 
between concentrated energy (low entropy) and dispersed 
energy (high entropy) . The second law of thermodynamics 
states that irrevocable percentages of energy becomes 
unavailable for man's use as energy is processed by living 
organisms or degraded through natural processes . Therefore, 
finite energy resources are an absolute constraint. On the 
other hand, mate r ials are not physically destroyed , but only 
changed . Given enough energy , they can be recycled . It is 
easily argued that we have the same amount of materials now 
as in the dawn of history . Berry (1972), Gilliland (1975) 
and !lannon (1975) conclude that energy is the most important 
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resource because it is the only . truly exhaustible one. All 
others can be recycled or synthesized, given enough energy . 
Thus, the value of a good is simply the amount of energy 
used to produce it . Hannon (1975) asserts that only through 
adoption of an energy unit of value and appropriate restruc-
turing of the economic and legal system can correct alloca-
tion of resources be obtained. 
Many energy accountants do not think that adopting an 
energy unit of value and Hannon ' s othe r measures are neces-
sary . Thus, at least three major groups have emerged who 
accept an energy theory of value in differing degrees . 
Odum ' s group, including Gilliland and Hannon, take the 
strongest pro - energy theory of value position . 
In his major work on energetics , Environment Power and 
Society, Odum (197 1 ) suggests that: 
1) All progress is due to special power subsidies; and 
2) Power is the common denominator to all process and 
materials . 
In a later work (1976, p . 30), H. Odum and E. Odum 
clearly state that energy is the mainspring of value . " It 
is not human beings and their money that determine what is 
important. It is the world's energy ." Thus, energy is the 
sole determinant of efficiency . "The greater the net energy 
obtained by a process, the more efficient the process " (Odum 
1973, p. 220) . 
Others elaborate Odum's hypothesis . Hannon (1975) 
suggests that energy intensive nations should raise the 
11 
relative price of energy to induce more labor intensive 
technologies, thereby increasing energy productivity. Berry 
(1972 , p . 10) said ; " It is desirable to minimize the con-
sumption of thermodynamic potential in achieving any goal ." 
This is the thermodynamic analog of the st~tement : " It is 
undesirable to throw away money needlessly." 
The second group of energy accountants say they reject 
the energy theory o'f value but seem to tacitly accept it . 
Slesser (1977), for example , states that outside the Odum 
school, no one to his knowledge accepts the theory . He then 
says that energy accounting is superior to economics in 
forecasing ene r gy requirements and thus in normative fore -
casting. From Slesser's statements it is clear that he does 
not think the market energy values are high enough . 
Economic markets may under value energy for several reasons . 
First, markets may ·not account for related non - market goods 
like pollution . Second , the true value of energy may not be 
reflected by regulated or otherwise imperfect markets. 
Third, markets might not allocate energy across generations 
correctly. Fourth , markets which are influenced by sub -
jective human demand may not price energy at its true value . 
Slesser does not mention the first two reasons . When he 
criticizes economic forecasts of energy requirements, he 
alludes to the intergenerational allocation of resources . 
In addition , his faith in the normative superiority of ener -
getics and therefore an energy numeraire shows that he 
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thinks that the energy markets do not assign energy its true 
value . Therefo r e , Slesser appear s c l ose to accepting an 
energy theory of value . 
The least sanguine group , including Bell (1977) and 
Bullard (1975) , clearly r eject the energy theory o f value. 
They argue that energetics can play only a secondary role in 
project evaluation . Bell , for example , agrees that energy 
accounting is useful only when comparing similar projects 
fo r ener gy efficiency . Bullard (1975) states that energy 
accounting may be useful in much the same way as environ-
mental impact statements are . It should be noted that this 
group views energy as a critical but poorly acknowledged 
constraint because t here would be no need t o emphasize 
ene r gy if markets accurately reflected energy scarcity . 
Thus , this g r oup impli citly assumes some type of market 
failure. 
Definition of Names 
Among energy analysts, there is general ag r eement that 
the second law of thermodynamics proves that finite energy 
sources are an abs olute constraint . None have attacked t he 
notion that ene rgy is the only absolute constraint be cau se 
materials can be rec ycled . However, disagreement exis ts o n 
two concepts : 
1) An ene r gy theory of value ; and 
2) The use of energy analyses as a normative policy 
tool . 
Only Odum' s g roup explici tly ac cept s the ener gy theory of 
value and its corolla ry that all values can be imputed to 
ener gy . Both Odum ' s group and some energy analysts like 
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Hannon a nd Slesser argue that energy analysis is a norma ti ve 
policy tool . The l ast gro up , including Bell and Bullard , 
r e je ct both concept s . Instead , they expand traditional 
engineering energy efficiency ba sed on the Carnot e ngine 
cycle to include energy efficien c i es of non - powe r producing 
goods and se r v ices . This g roup s uppo ses no norma tive 
superiority. However , energy " effic i ency " (abbreviated to 
efficiency in the literature) is at least an implicit goal . 
Hereafter , to facilitate discussi on , those who ex plicitly or 
impli cit ly acce pt an energy theory of value , including Odu m, 
Slesser , Hannon and the like will be referred to as ener-
getists a nd their work energetics b ecause of th ei r normative 
approach . The second g roup , including Bell and Bullard , who 
simply expan d th e ran ge of energy efficiency a naly s is, will 
be cal led ene rgy accountants and their work ene rgy account -
ing . Energy analysts and energy a nalysis will be used to 
deno te both g roup s and the ir work . Later sections that d i s -
cuss empirical meth ods will require the distinc ti o n between 
the gross energy accounting and net e nergy accounting 
schools . Net energy accountants are energetists . Some 
g r oss e nergy accountants , e . g ., Slesse r and Hannon , a r e 
ene r geLists , while others , includ in g Bell and Bulla r d , are 
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energy accountants . 
En e rgetists who see en~rgy analysis as a major r eplace -
ment or supplement to traditional economics follow a logic 
and come to conclusions that can be summa r ized roughly in 
the following manner . Fi r st, non - living earth resources are 
finite . However , since energy can be used to recycle or 
process low grade mineral s , energy is the ultimate limiting 
constraint . In order , then , to insure future welfare , we 
mu st conse rve energy as much as possible . Prese nt mark et 
forces do not reco gnize the critical nature of the energy 
co nstraint . Extra market forces must move the economy 
toward a steady state . To achieve this , the present deci -
sion matrix must be changed to reflect the importance of 
energy . 
Energetics , using the more stable and accurate energy 
num eraire , reflects energy pre - eminence and should supple -
ment or replace economics . 
Two energetic conclusions are clear : 
1) That energy accounting can improve intergenera-
tional r esource allocations ; and , 
2) That an e nergy numeraire is superior to dollar 
units . 
Improving Intcrgenerational Allocation 
Through Energy Accounting 
Energy analysts assert that markets under value energy 
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and fail to consider finite fossil fuel stock s . As a 
r es ult, the present generation squanders fuel s and res our c es 
that should be left for future ones . Ecologi s ts wh o espouse 
this position maintain that economies compete according to 
Latka ' s principle ( 1922) . This principle stat e s that the 
system which survives is that which maximizes the useful 
power from all sources . This means that ener gy - inefficient 
but fast growing biosystems are adapted when ne w energy 
sources open but slower growing , more energy efficient 
biosystems are adopted once virgin energy sources are tapped 
and competition for availa ble energy increases . Energetists 
agree that few new energy supplies are available and that 
economic growth is non - adjustive . A steady economic state 
with zero growth that husbands energy resource s is the sys -
tem that will survive , given present constraints . Odum 
(1973) suggests that unless such a steady state is 
approached now , ecological and cultural disast e rs are 
unavoidable and that energetics can correct th e market 
myopia and help smooth transition to the steady state . 
Energetists theorize that in a steady state , the ener -
getic interest rate will be zero . A zero interest rate 
insures that present and future wealth is value d equally 
because it is impossible to save a current dollar to gain 
more than one dollar in the future . Positive interest 
rates, on the other hand , cause future incomes to be dis -
counted, i . e . , to borrow one dollar today one must give up 
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more than one dollar in the future . As a result, these 
groups suggest society should not have a positive interest 
ra te for two reas ons . First, energy is measured in units 
that do not change over time . Hence , the inflation portion 
of the interest rate is zero . Second, in a steady state , no 
material gains are possible in the future through current 
savings and therefore a dollar saved today cannot yield more 
than one dollar in the future (Clark 1974) . 
Energy Units as Numerai re 
Energetic advocates agree that an energy unit, be it 
BTU, KWH, etc ., is or should be stable . Two years or 1000 
years from now, a unit of ene rgy will still be a unit of 
energy . This does away with the problems of inflation and 
price movements due to changes in demand. 
A classical example of the fallacy of market values is 
that of oil shale. It was projected that when oil reached 
$3 . 73/bbl, or $6 . 80/bbl , or $15 . 00/bbl, or $21 . 00/bbl, or 
$25 . 00/bbl , (Bell 1977 , p . 5) , extraction from oil shale 
would become feasible . Energetists argue that the energy 
content of a BTU will never change . As a result, energy is 
a more telling and stable numeraire . In the words of 
Malcolm Slesser (1977, p . 259), 
Free market shale oil would never be economical until 
oil from crude has a gross energy requirement per bar -
rel close that of oil shale 
See also Gilliland (1975) . Furthermore, because energy is 
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the on ly absolutely limiting factor, long term costing is 
best done in energy units (Berry 1972 and Slesser 1977) . 
According to this view, energy analysis , because future 
energy costs are more stable than future prices, is a better 
indicator signalling future problems than discounted dollar 
costs . This advantage is derived from the fact that work 
values of energy are affected by technology alone which 
changes slowly . "T~chnology will not help in five years; 
will be of little help in 15; but can do anything in 50" 
according to Teller (1976). On the other hand , dollar 
values are more volatile being subject to changes in demand , 
supply, technology and inflation . 
Furthermore, energy analysts point out the difficulties 
economics has with non - market goods such as pollution and 
destruction of scenic areas. First , it is pointed out that 
benefit/cost ratios do not measure all the effects of man's 
action on his environment . Second , clearly the economic 
measures can change drastically depending on such things as 
the discount rate used and the relative evaluation of 
aesthetic and recreat ional opportunities. Finally , using 
dollars to compare environmental and social benefits and 
costs is literally an exercise in comparing wild ducks and 
super highways . Energetists express all values in terms of 
the amount of energy used in goods p r oduced or lost when the 
eco - system is altered . At least three proponents state that 
energetics is the true measure of environmental impact (Odum 
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1971, Berry 1972 and Cook 1975). Cook, for example, thinks 
that the primary benefit of energetics is to arrive at 
evaluations of externalities not based on aesthetics but on 
energy value to society. Slesser (1975, p. 171), espouses 
the strongest form of this dogma: "To measure the cost of 
things in money" which is, after all, nothing more than a 
highly sophisticated value judgment, "does not offer a firm 
basis for evaluation." Berry adds (1972, p. 9): 
Actually, if economists were to look at scarcity in a 
more complete way, their estimates would come closer 
and closer to the estimate of thermodynamicists. 
In summary, energy analysts maintain that economics 
overlooks absolute energy constraints and as a result, 
misallocates resources. To correct these problems, ener-
getists suggest employing an energy theory of value and the 
resulting energy numeraire to correct resource misalloca-
tions. Energy accountants urge greater use of energy effi-
ciency ratios in project evaluation. Procedures which 
energy analysts have developed to facilitate their sug-
gestions will be explored in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER III 
EMPIRICAL METHODS USED BY ENERGY ANALYSTS 
Energy analysts disagree on some issues and as a result 
have developed several ~mpirical methodologies. 
When Odum and others developed energetics , several 
questions arose . For example : Should the sunlight and 
labor be included in energy calculations ; should the empha-
sis be on maximizing the energy available to consumers or 
minimizing the insitu energy used to produce final energy ; 
what energy units are to be used ; what conversi on between 
energy sources is correct; how are material resources such 
as metal to be valued in energy terms ; how is energy mea-
sured? 
These questions caused divisions among the supporters 
of energy analysis . The situation is so undecided ener -
getist P. F . Chapman (1974a, p . 91) said : "There are as 
many methods as there are workers in the field ." However, 
there appears to be two main schools . Odum and his follow-
ers assume that energy is the only limiting factor in an 
economy. They therefore include sunlight and labor in their 
accounts because both represent energy input . Odum's group 
usually employ net energy analysis which seeks to find the 
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net energy available to the consumer . 
Others including Slesser (1976) and Bullard (1975) the -
orize that energy i s important and is under represented in 
economics but for project analysis , the energy contained in 
sunlight and labor is disregarded b ecause both are present 
wh e ther or not a project is built . This group is generally 
referred the g r oss energy accountants . They adhere to the 
methodology of the International Federation of Institutes 
for Advanced Study in Sweden (IFIAS 1974) . IFIAS views 
energy account ing as the determination of the ene r gy 
sequeste r ed in the process of making a good or service . 
On a practical level , both maj or schools represent a 
duality ; maximizing available energy to c o n sumers is the 
same as minimizing e n ergy insitu used per unit of final 
energy consumed . As a result , both methods have complimen-
tary strengths and weaknesses. Net energy analysis focuses 
on energy delivered to consumers a nd does not evaluate the 
efficiency of the processes . Gross e nergy focuses on effi -
ciency of providing e n ergy a nd says nothing of total energy 
delivered to consumers . 
A list of f our energy analysis objectives is provided 
by Chapman (1974a , p . 94) : 
1) To analyze particular processes in detail to deduce 
an energy e ff ic i e nc y and hence make recommendation s f or con -
s e rving energy ; 
2 ) To analyze the consumpti o n of energy on a large 
scale either to forecast energy demand or to point to 
policies which could reduce future demand ; 
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3) To analyze the energy consumption of basic techno -
logies such as food production and mine r al extraction to 
show some of the future consequences of technological trends 
or an energy shortage ; and 
4) To construct energy costs and examine energy flows 
so as to understand the thermodynamics of an industrial sys -
tem. This type of long- range aim may be coupled to projects 
such as " world modeling " based on physical rather than mone -
tary flows . 
These general objectives are listed h i e r archially so 
that a study under objective one could be part of a larger 
one under 2 , 3 or 4 . Energetic studies include all four 
objectives . Energy accounting studies include objective one 
and possibly two . 
Regardless of ideology, researchers use four basic 
methods to carry out studies . First , ene r gy analysts esti -
mate costs of many energy intensive goods through basic 
research . Exa mpl es of this method inc l ude Bell ' s ( 1977) 
estimation of BTU/CY of concrete and earth work and the 
Colorado Ene r gy Resea r ch Institutes ' (1976) study of nine 
fossil fuel appl i cations . The major p r oblem with this 
method is that i t is time consuming and requi r es expertise 
in the targeted processes . 
Second , investigators with little time or expertise 
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find costs of many industrial items by referring to 
statistical tables supplying energy consumed per unit of 
output. Results are often order of magnitude estimates 
because the energy used to process primary energy sources 
and capital depreciation are not included in the estimates . 
Process analysis is a third method used by energy 
analysts . Analysts first identify all processes contribut-
ing to the final product . (See Figure 4 . ) Each individual 
process is then studied to identify its inputs . Finally, 
each input is assigned an energy requirement and the total 
project energy is obtained through addition . Process 
analysis suffers from three main drawbacks. First , arbi-
trary decisions about the system boundaries must be made 
such as the limits of boundaries 1, 2 and 3 in Figure 4. 
Second, energy values for some inputs are difficult to esti -
mate. Finally , the economy is often so complex that every 
important secondary or tertiary input is not found . There -
fore, process analysis is often truncated at the primary 
inputs . 
The fourth method uses the national input-output (I/O) 
tables to estimate energy requirements . An entry in the 
Table Xij represents the dollar amount of good "i", needed 
to produce a dollar of output "j". (See Figure 5.) 
En e rgy Cost 
of l1ater ial 
a e rJ. a~ s 
Flour 
Ye ast, 
Bounda r y 
Thre e 
Ene r gy Cost 
o f Plant 
) Bu i l din g 
Plan t 
Ove n s , 
e t c . 
'------L 
tYl _-~Boundary 1 Two I 
Ene r gy Used _______ -7.: n- ~:;e-ryl-~ B1ound ar y 
in Ba i:e :- / -- - r 1 I One 
: / Ba kers Sho p l 1 
T r ansoor~ S ~ ~r-g~ --~ i-- -- :L o a ~' 
L--~ - - -
Figu r e 4: Bo un da r ies f o r pr ocess analysis 
( Sou r ce Chapman 19 76 . ) 
X x p 
X X 
1 1 l n [] 
X X 
nl nn 
Fi gur e 5 . Mathe matical mode l of an economy's 
ene rgy budget 
B 
B 
Co n su rne d 
n 
23 
For a given set o f outpu t s, say vec tor P, the input 
requirements, vector B, can be found by mul ti plying mat rixes 
X and P; that is: 
XP = B 
All goods (vector Z) needed to produce B can be found by the 
same method: 
Z = BX = X (X ( ?) ) - x2 p 
Hence, all direct and indirect inputs used produce output P 
are : 
2 3 n 
+ X P + X P . . . +X P 
This series can be summed (Chiang 1974) and is equal to : 
P(I - X) - 1 
The r esul t is that all the energy inputs for any given 
output can be obtai ned by multiplying the matrix ( I - X)- 1 by 
an appropriate energy conversion (vecto r E) to obtain energy 
r equirements e: 
e = E(I - A) - 1 
The energy research group located a t the University of 
Illinois at Urbana (1980) developed energy r equirements for 
all 357 goods l isted in each of the 1963, 1967 and 1971 
United States I/O tables . Chapman (1974b) developed less 
complete data for the United Kingdom . 
There are some disadvantages to this approach as well . 
Clearly, the I/0 tables are highly aggregated. Another dis -
advantage is that the I /0 data is in doll a rs, not physical, 
units . This can lead to errors if goods hav e large t r ans -
por tation costs or pr ic e fluctuations . Furthermore , energy 
data deriv e d f r om dollar deno minated I/0 tables are no more 
accurate than the data f r om which they are derived. 
However, I /O t ables have great ly speeded energetic 
analysis. Before tables we re availab l e , wo r kers had to 
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analyze the process by which each good was made to assign 
energy costs . The tables make it possible to truncate the 
process whenever little information is available on the 
input s or they appear to be relati vely energy unintensive . 
Many examples of ener gy analysis are available from the 
University of Illinois Energy Research Group ( 1974) . We now 
turn to the evaluation of the theo r etical constraints of 
ener gy analysis models . 
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CHAPTER IV 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
Much economic research has studied res ource scarcity , 
mi sallocations , theories of value and intergenerational 
allocations and numeraires. Several problems remain 
unresolved . Each issue will be examined and the potential 
contribution of energy accounting will be discussed . 
Resource Scarcit y 
It must be noted at the outset that there is debate as 
to whether resources are truly finite in historical time. 
Peterson and Fisher (1977 , p . 692) state that : 
Minerals are like the juice in an orange . The total 
amount extracted depends on how hard the orange is 
squeezed and there is a lways a little left behind .. 
this relates to the definition of reserves, the known 
amounts of a mineral that can profitably be recovered 
at current prices . 
Mineral discoveries, technical change or price increases can 
therefore increase reserves (Brobst , et al 1973) . Barnett 
and Morse (1963) wrote the seminal work on this subject. 
They pointed out that in the period of 1870- 1957, 
tecnological progress and new resource discoveries 
outweighed the higher costs of lower quality and 
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inaccessible resources in agriculture and mining. Their 
thesis was simply that the inseparable role technology plays 
i n modern economic growth can circumvent both Ricardian and 
Malthusian scarcities . 
Mo r e recently , Nordhous (1974) showed that relative 
prices of eleven minerals have fallen vis - a - vis labor since 
1900 . Substitution of labor and capital for natural 
resources and cheaper more abundant raw materials for more 
expensive materials are documented by Rosenberg (1973) and 
Humphrey and Moroney (1975) . 
Others have echoed this theme , i . e . , resource stocks 
can only be defined in terms of technology . The most 
extreme view was expressed by McAvory (1979 , p . 1) : "Ulti -
mately, there is no such thing as a nonrenewable resource . " 
Cautions and dissenting opinions have been offered . Vernon 
Smith (1976) states that the rate of decline in mineral 
prices has tended to diminish in absolute magnitude over 
time. Mineral reserve studies also ignore environmental 
costs of mineral extraction (Fisher and Peterson 1976). 
Georgescu- Roegen (1971) warns against extrapolating 
Barnett and Morse's data because it covers an abnormal 
period in which resource discoveries outstripped the ability 
to use them . Because low entropy (energy) is the " taproot 
of economic scarcity , " any pricing system market or ener -
getic will ultimately fail once the theoretical limits of 
usable material and energy are reached. 
Even if critical shor t ages of materials or energy 
will lead to civilization ' s demise , the issue is whether 
energetics provides a better estimate of finite resources. 
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Economi sts recognize that reserve estimates need 
improvement . Peters on and Fisher (1977) and Herfindahl and 
Kneese (1974) , for example , suggest closer collaboration 
with geologists on reserve estimations . Although ener -
getists including Gilliland (1975) , Berry (1972) and Odum 
(1973) agree that energetics provides better reserve esti -
mates, they have yet to advance their own reserve estimates . 
In addition , a major conceptual problem awaits their 
efforts . Energetists define reserves in energy unit s while 
markets, if not society , define reserves as that which is 
r ecoverable , given current prices and technology . Prices 
reflect human tastes and . preferences (demand) and the human 
effort needed to procure goods and services (supply) . 
Energy units do not reflect human desires or toil and as 
such cannot serve as a guide to the maximization of human 
welfare . Georgescu- Roegen ( 19 79) shows a priori that ener gy 
analysts cannot provide better estimates of resource 
reserves that are economically exp l oitabl e . His analysis is 
reviewed on page 38 . 
Resource Misallocation 
Energetists argue that economics is not efficient in an 
energy sense and thus misallocates resources . Few 
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economists equate energy efficiency with overall economic 
efficiency. Economic efficiency is a measure of the 
preservation of all resources with respect to the lowest 
dollar cost pe r unit of output . Thus , economic efficiency 
implies energy efficiency but not vice versa . For example, 
market forces dictate that a firm uses each resource " effi -
ciently" relative to the othe r scarce resources employed in 
a process . 
Let a firm make good (G) with labor ( L) costing PL and 
energy (E) , costing PE. The cost of producing a good (PG) 
can be found using the equation : 
PG = (PE)(E)+ (PL)(L) 
If a unit of energy costs $1 . 00 and a unit of labor 
$5 . 00 , relative efficiency dictates that six units of energy 
will not be used for a job that one unit of labor could do 
because energy to accomplish the job would cost $6 . 00 while 
labor could accomplish it for $5 . 00 . Similarly, using 1/4 
unit of labor to do what one unit of energy could do would 
be economically inefficient . In fact , market competition 
forces the firm to use resources in a ratio that equates 
marginal output per unit of resource cost for all resources . 
To employ resources in any other manner would mean that the 
output could be produced more cheaply by employing more of 
the factors that have a greater marginal product per dollar 
and less o f those with smaller marginal product per dollar. 
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Marginal Product of Labor 
Price of Labor 
Marginal Product of Energy 
Price of Energy 
Therefore , economic efficiency implies efficient use of all 
resources in the sense that all resources are used to supply 
human desires, given relative resource prices and industrial 
techniques at the lowest overall cost. 
Efficiency as espoused by adherents of the energy the -
ory of value dictates that output per unit of energy 
expended be maximized. This definition of efficiency 
ignores the other constraints (in the example , Price of 
Labor) and is therefore economically inefficient . The the -
oretical basis for energetic efficiency is that energy is 
the only absolute constraint and therefore maximizing output 
per energy expended is efficient from man ' s point of view. 
Economists do not ignore material constraints . How-
ever , economists agree that markets may waste resources or 
be "inefficient ," depending on one's normative assumptions, 
and may misallocate resources in cases of monopoly , non-mar -
ket goods, government regulations , externalities, commonly 
held resources and the like (Bator 1958, Scitovsky 1954). 
In r esponse to these shortcomings, economists have developed 
several models to assess and correct market failures in non-
renewable resource allocations. Highlighting of the 
relevant models follows. Gray (1914) formulated the first 
comprehensive theo r y of exhaustible resources. Despite the 
model ' s static nature, Gray was able to project price time 
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paths and the effects of taxes on the dynamic mining indus-
try. In his seminal work , Hotelling (1931) developed the 
first dynamic model, i . e . , one that would optimize present 
and future extraction of a nonrenewable r esource. More 
recently , Gordon (1967) and Cummings (1969) used dynamic 
modeling to determine optimal resource extraction rates . 
These authors concluded that mineral reserves are capital 
assets that receive a normal rate of return, i . e . , are effi-
ciently utilized in an economic scene in the absence of mar -
ket imperfections. Hotelling (1931), Stiglitz (1976) , 
Sweeney (1977) an·d Weinstein and Zeckhauser (1974) have used 
models to predict monopo l y extraction rates without con -
census as to whether it produces an extraction rate greater , 
lesser o r equal to a free market. 
Koopmans (1974) modeled extraction rates as interest 
rates in~rease and concluded they would increase. Others, 
e . g ., Krutilla (1975), suggest that if exploration or other 
large investments are needed to increase extraction, 
extraction will decrease when interest rat es rise . 
Hotelling ( 1931), He r findahl and Kneese (1974) ag r ee that 
exploration for reserves is decreased when exploration gives 
neighboring property owners free mineral deposit informa-
tion. Schulze (1974) and Weinstein and Zechhause r (1974) 
show that , with some caveats , a free market re sults in the 
optima l amount of recycling . Ayres and Kneese ( 1969) , 
Fisher and Peterson (1976), a mong others , explore the 
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interaction between environment and resource extraction . 
Dasgupta, et al (1976) model extraction rates in the face of 
uncertain future demands and technology . 
Such models suggest methods to correct misallocations 
and raise additional questions . More importantly, they show 
that markets allocate nonrenewable resources as well as 
other resources . Energetics has not developed competing or 
complimentary models . The energy theory of value will be 
examined to ascertain if it can support such models. 
The Energy Theory of Value 
One or more of .the following crite ria must be m~t if 
energetics is to replace or supplement economics : 
1) Energy is the true limiting factor and as such is 
more important than traditional economics holds ; 
2) Energy is the only ultimate source of value; 
3) The tools of energetics, e . g . , energy numeraire and 
energy evaluations of environment , are superi or to their 
economic counterparts; and 
4) An energetic model reflects the world better than 
economic models . 
Energy as an Absolute Constraint 
Energetists claim that material dissipation can be com -
pletely reversed, given enough energy . Therefore, energy is 
the single absolute constraint . Several physics concepts 
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contradict this logic . First , the Heisenberg uncertainty 
principle ( 1927) showed that at the subatomic level , it is 
impossible to simultaneously observe the position and veloc -
ity of an object . The determi nat i on of the position depends 
on the abil i ty to observe it . But , observing such small 
particles , even with something as delicate as light waves , 
changes the velocity of the particle . Thus , there is a the -
oretical lower limit to the size of particles which ca n be 
observed and gathered . Georgescu - Roegen (1979) arrives at 
the same co nclu sion using different means . 
There is a strict material e n ergy dichotomy . Energy 
cannot be u sed to purify materials i ndefi n itely because 
Planck (1932) showed that no gas , liquid or solid can be 
freed from the last traces of foreign contaminating sub-
stances . Exceptions can occur only at absolute zero . But 
Nernst ' s third law of thermodynamics showed that absolute 
zero cannot be obtained . Georgescu - Roegen (1971) offers 
other (though more contr oversial) reasons . First , processes 
are perfectly reversible only i f perfectly reversible 
machines exist ; but , perfectly revers i ble machines must be 
frictionles s . Frictionless machines exist only if the pro -
cess is infi nitely slow . Thus , no use f ul work can be 
deri ved from t hem . Second , in order to derive benefit from 
en e rgy , materia l receptacles must be used . As the 
rec e ptacles wea r out , an infinite regress of materials is 
ne e rled to process the energy . Finally , th ese physical 
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concepts demonstrate that materials and energy are limiting 
factors . If this is true, preoccupation with the energy 
theory of value is counterproductive. 
Energy as the Sole Source of Value 
To economists, the most serious problem with the ener-
getic approach is that some energetists attempt to, in 
Hannon's words (1975, p. 101), "maximize productivity per 
energy unit" expended rather than social welfare . Economist 
Georgescu- Roegen (1979) flat ly states that there is no 
direct connection between energy flows and the enjoyment of 
life. Utility is a flow derived from energy, materials and 
psychic intangibles . The energy theory of value leads to 
spurious economics because it fails to address the multiple 
source and objectives of human welfare. 
The Energetic Model and Reality 
The assumption that energy analysis yields information 
in addition to that provided by economics is held by all 
energy analysts. For example, the Colorado Research Group 
(1976) rejects the energy theory of value and then suggests 
that an energy criterion be used to evaluate projects alike 
in every respect except energy efficiency. This suggestion 
clearly implies that economics does not reflect differences 
in energy efficiency. However, the energy theory of value 
considers only one of a host of factors influencing economic 
35 
activity. Thus , the theory is unlikely to supply a satis -
factory economic model. 
It is instructive to review other theories of value. 
In the 17th century, commerce was often strapped for means 
of exchange. A group of political economists of the time, 
the merchantilists , assumed that the source of wealth was 
precious metal and championed laws to foster bullion 
accumulation . Misselden, for example (1662 , p. 19) , urged 
that England " restrict trade within Christendom in order to 
preserve treasure." Two centuries later, Marx noted the 
travails of the laborer and expounded the labor theory of 
value . Marx (1906 , p . 46) said: 
We see then that which determines that magnitude of the 
value of any article is the amount of labor socially 
necessary or the labor time socially necessary for its ' 
production . 
Marx (1906, p . 114) also does not think market prices 
reflect the true value of a good . 
Magnitude of value expresses the connection that neces -
sarily exists between a certain article and the portion 
of the total labor time of society requ i red to produce 
it . As soon as a magnitude of value is converted into 
price , the above necessa r y relation takes the shape of 
a more or less accidental exchange ratio between a 
single commodity and another ; the money commodity . 
One of the latest champions of the unde r valued 
production factor is Naisbitt (1984) who thought the value 
of the revolution in information technology was 
underestimated . "We need to create a knowledge theo r y of 
value to replace Marx ' s obsolete labor theory of value ." 
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Thus, merchantilists, Marxists, energetists and 
Naisbett have maintained that a single production factor is 
a key source of value and that market prices do not reflect 
this. A brief comparison of Marx's theory and the energy 
theory of value follows. Both Marxists and energetists 
maintain that a single production factor is the source of 
value and that market prices often do not reflect correct 
values. 
The labor theory of value is criticized because it can-
not explain value derived from scarcity or great utility 
such as the Mona Lisa. Energetics, similarly, cannot 
explain why the price of most goods and services does not 
correspond to their energy contents. Both Marxists and 
Odum's group are vague on qualitative differences in labor 
and energy respectively. Slesser (1974) , for example, 
thinks it unfortunate that energy forms are not priced the 
same per BTU. He does not offer an explanation of these 
differences. Marxists and energetists maintain that inter -
est rates would be zero if the correct numeraire were used 
and exploitation of the source of value stopped. 
If either the labor or energy theory of value were used 
to price resources, serious allocative and equity problems 
would arise. For example, if interest rate, i.e., the price 
of capital, were zero and other production factors were 
priced according to the energy embodied in them, owners of 
resources would be paid only for the fractions of 
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technology , land, labor, etc ., that are the result of energy 
e xpenditures . As a result, owners of non - energy factors 
would be paid less than the "full value " of their productive 
factors and would supply less of them, ceteris paribus . A 
serious equity problem would result because rents that nor -
mally would accrue to owners of non - energy resources would 
accrue to those owning energy resources. However , it should 
be noted that at least some energetists feel that democracy 
can't exist in the face of serious energy shortages and look 
to a socialist government to ameliorate allocation and eth -
ical considerations . 
Neoclassical economic theory offers a more complete 
explanation of the source of value . Value is derived from 
all inputs , including land , labor , capital , techno l ogy , 
energy and expertise ; all of which have intrinsic value and 
therefore require remunerati on . In addition , the pleasure 
consumers derive from the output also figures into the eval -
uation via demand . Table 1 summarizes the sources of value 
according to the labor, energy and neoclassical theories of 
value . 
From Table 1, it is apparent tha t energetics does not 
account for the overwhelming majority o f factors providing 
uti li ty to peopl e . In addition, some factors cannot be 
reduced to energy units (e . g ., tastes) . It is apparent that 
analysis based on an energy theory of value cannot tell us 
more about social welfare than neoclas si cal analysis. 
Table 1 . Summary of sources of value according 
to the labo r ener gy and neoclassical theories 
of value 
Labor theory 
of value 
Energy theory 
of value 
Neoclassical 
economics 
Determinants of Value 
Demand Factors 
None 
None 
Price of related 
income, expecta-
tions , tastes 
transaction, 
costs, other 
Supply Factors 
Labor 
Energy 
Cost of input, 
e . g ., wages, 
rent, t r ans -
action costs , 
technology , 
expectations, 
other 
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Georgescu-Roegen (1979, p . 1046) provided a mathematic 
p r oof of these conclusions . He starts with an input - output 
technology matrix X. The X matrix is multiplied by a column 
vector of energy equivalents (b 1 b 2 b 3 • • • b n) denoted b . 
Multiplying X and b yields a vector of energy needs to pro -
duce each good , e . Therefore , 
1) xb = e 
relates production of goods to total energy budget (e) . 
Georgescu- Roegen takes the same technology matrix X 
multiplies it by the price vector for each item p = (p 1 Pz p 3 
. pn) to obtain a total dollar budget B. That is : 
k 
i 
2) xp = B 
B is a column vector B = (B 1 B2 ... Bn) where Bi (pi 
• +P X ) 
1 1 
and K 
n 
and S represent the price of 
n 
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capital and other fact ors of production. 
In the energy model (equation one) the energy budget e 
can, given technology x, yield energy costs for every good . 
In case two no price determinations are possible because 
there are more variables, e . g . , Pk and P n' than equations . 
In two, the B values can only be determined when these 
values are supplied by markets. Market prices reflect the 
tastes, incomes, preferences and expe ctations of consumers 
that energetic analysis does not address . 
Georgescu- Roegen (1979 , p . 1048) concludes that : 
It is now perfectly clear that in absolutely no sit -
uation is it possible for the energy equivalents to 
represent economic evaluations . Although the matrix 
of the price system 2 is the same as that of the 
energy equivalents the former cannot be equivalent 
to the latter . 
The deficiency of energetics as a decision tool is 
evident in public works evaluation . Benefit/cost ratios are 
the traditional method used . The benefit/cost test is a 
"potential pareto optimal criterion . " The true pareto 
optimal criterion is that a project makes no one worse off 
and at least one person better off . By this criterion , a 
project would be feasible only if those who benefit could 
and did compensate the total losses of those who lose . The 
potential pareto benefit/cost test considers a project 
worthwhile if compensation to losers could be made whether 
or not it is . Clearly, under a benefit/cost test if the sum 
of losses and gains is positive there is an increase in 
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social welfare . Society therefore pursues pareto optimal or 
potential pareto optimal solutions in order to increase or 
maximize social welfare. Adopting an energy criterion , 
e . g ., energy efficiency of processes or maximum net energy 
to consumers, decreases the likelihood of reaching the 
pareto optimal allocation . For example , net energy account -
ing often does not account for differences in energy quality 
or availability . Therefore, if net energy analys i s were 
used to maximize net energy available to consumers, explod -
ing a hydrogen bomb could appear more beneficial than pro -
ducing one million bushels of wheat . 
Energy Analysis Efficiency and Reality 
Energy analysis expands traditional engineering energy 
efficiency ratios to include all project inputs and outputs . 
Energy efficiency (abbreviated to efficiency in energy 
analysis literature) is based on the theoretical maximum 
work available from a Carnot engine . The theoretical Carnot 
engine cycle is firmly based in the first law of 
thermodynamics . However, the law pertains only to energy 
efficiencies . Thus , energy efficiencies must give way to 
the wider concept of economic efficiency when project values 
are in part the result of mate r ials constraints and human 
desires . For example, energy efficiency is only part of the 
basis for economic evaluation of steam driven electric tur -
bines . The market value of the metals and technologies used 
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in producing the turbine must also be considered . When the 
project includes a large percentage of materials or tech -
nology, e . g ., a dam or electronic computer , energy account -
i ng is less applicable because subjective human values play 
larger roles in project evaluation . 
Therefore, if energy analys i s is to provide relevant 
information, energy analysts must realize that: 
1) Economic efficiency is a b r oader measure than 
energy efficiency ; 
2) Regarding energy efficiency as efficient in a 
social sense is flirting with an energy theory of value or 
the notion that energy is the sole absolute constraint; and 
3) Energy efficiencies may or may not provide informa-
tion relevant to economic evaluations. 
Economic Evaluation of the Energy Numer~ire 
Despite Be rry's and Slesser ' s assurances to the con -
trary, the use of energy numeraire does not give us the 
information needed to allocate resources. First, the energy 
numeraire is not stable. Technology changes can cause 
energy numeraire fluctuations in a relatively short time . 
For example , in 1963, the Kilo - calorie to dollar ratio was 
21 , 200 ; in 1970, 17,300 and 15 , 800 in 1972 (Gilliland 1975) . 
Second , energy is not the sole s ource of value . There -
fore, the value of the marginal physical product should be 
equated for all resources not just energy. This principle 
can be illustrated with the oil shale example . The 
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energetic notion that oil shale is economically feasible 
on l y when the net energy from oil shale approximates that of 
crude oil is completely false . If large increases in demand 
or OPEC decreases in supply cause price increas es large 
enough so that oil shale is p r ofitable , producers will not 
hesitate to produce oil shale, whether o r not it is a net 
energy producer . Crude oil owners would simply earn rents 
on the cheaper crude ·energy sources . The idea that energy 
r esources will be produced unt i l energy content of all 
sourc es are equal is a partial analog of the econo mic para -
digm : 
Marginal Product X 
p 
X 
Marginal Pro duct Y 
p 
y 
This formula accounts for the subjective evaluation (e . g ., 
convenience and cleanness) of different energy resources and 
their relative costs of production. When we oppose the 
above economic formula with the energy equivalent, marginal 
energy product X = marginal energy product Y, we see that 
energetics numeraire short run stability is brought through 
the loss of relevant information. 
Changing market evaluations reflect changes in human 
abilities for whatever reason to gain utility from an object 
in a welfare maximizing soc iety; such changes cannot be 
ign ored . Third, although it may be true that energy 
accounting conce ivably coul d measure all of the energy flows 
that cross an ecosystem's interface, it does not solve the 
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problem of evaluating the worth of stich energy quantities to 
people or even to p l ants and animals . Is an acre of wild 
hay as valuable as an acre of soybeans just because their 
net energies are the same (Bell 1977)? Are Canadian geese 
and whooping cranes , whic h ' are approximately the same size, 
of equal value? The basic problem is to design human wel-
fare values where no subjective market exists . The use of 
an energy numeraire is a step backward in that people do not 
value BTU's qua BTU , but f or what each type of energy con -
tributes to human welfare . 
Intergenerational Resource Allocations 
The notion that a zero growth steady state is that 
optimal path for present and future generations is subject 
to much debate . Koopmans (1974) shows, for example, that 
given convex utility functions , even with a zero interest 
rate, society will choose to consume nonreplenishable 
resources at above minimum subsistence rates . Many 
economists , among them Baumuol (1968) and Huettner (1975) 
postulate that resource consumption in the present will 
allow us to increase the standard of living in the future 
via capital accumulation and technological changes . Zealous 
conservation under these conditions would mean taxing the 
present poor to subsidize the future rich. Other economists 
disagree with this rosey assessment , e . g ., Schumpeter (1934) 
and Georgescu - Roegen (1979) and Rawls (1971) . Regardless of 
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the outcome of this debate , for the foreseeable future, zero 
growth is not an acceptable national political goal of any 
western democracy . Witness, for example, the political 
ramifications of recession and depression on United States 
presidential elections . 
Economists are far more united in their rejection of 
the notion that a steady state would produce a zero interest 
rate . The basis for this assessment lies in both the 
mater i al and psychological worlds . The material realities 
dictate that capital goods in a steady state wear out . 
Therefore , there will always be choice s between consuming 
and saving to replac e capital, which capital to replace , 
when to replace it and the length of the pay back period . 
On the human level , the concept that passed some point 
increased consumption results in diminishing marginal 
utility is well established . This notion leads directly to 
the assessment that there i s a positive price that must be 
paid for foregoing current as well as future consumption . 
The same logic holds for aggregate consumption and pre -
ferences . In addition , inasmuch as most biologists theorize 
that the lot of any species is ultimate extinction, human 
society , if it is risk adve r se , will generally discount an 
uncertain future , albeit to a smal l er degree than private 
individuals . However , some question the ethics of discount -
ing the future (Nehe r 1976 and Nash 1975), but do not dis -
pute the fact that individuals and society do discount the 
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future. 
Economists have questioned what the correct social rate 
of discount is. The majority writing on the subject 
conclude that the optimal social discount rate is less than 
the private market rate because of risk incurred by private 
investors and/or corporate taxes (Harberger 1968). 
Harberger derives perhaps the most accepted social rate of 
discount which can conceivably be tested empirically . In 
addition, some economists , notably Harberger, show that the 
private individual ' s interest rate differs from the market 
rate because of taxes or fixed individual savings . 
Dissenting economists , notably Marglin (1963), argue 
that private market determined interest rates have no 
bearing on the optimal social discount rate. 
In summary, although there is not total agreement among 
economists as to the proper discount rate , or modeling 
techniques, intergenerational resource allocation must be 
decided in one manner or another . Economists have sought 
theoretical and empirical evidence of the correct path or 
paths to follow. More work must be done. However, energy 
analysis does not appear capable of yielding significant 
information on intergenerational allocation over and above a 
market decision because : 
1) Energetics has not developed and cannot support a 
model of intergenerational resource allocation , see page 28 . 
Therefore, energetics cannot assume, considering current 
modeling , positive growth and interest rates and current 
political realities that their arguments regarding zero 
growth and zero interest rates are to be regarded as 
anything more than normative statements . 
From the preceding discussion, it is evident that : 
1) Energy is probably not the only limiting factor; 
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2) Energy is not the ultimate source of all value ; and 
3) Energy numeraires are not superior to dollars when 
evaluating human desires and costs ; and 
4) Energetics models of the economy are non- existent 
and the theoretical foundations for them are deeply flawed . 
Th~refore, energetics, as far as it embraces an energy 
theory of value, is of no practical modeling significance in 
resource allocation. 
We now turn our attention to energy and economic 
analysis and their comparisons of flat water recreation at 
selected Utah reservoirs . 
CHAPTER V 
SURVEY TECHNIQUES 
To compare economic and energy analysis results, a 
survey was undertaken to obtain data on recreational energy 
use, travel distance and time spent on four selected Utah 
reservoirs . 
The same questionnaire was employed to gather data for 
both the economic and energy ana l yses . 
Questionnaire Design 
The basic data regarding recreationists on Willard Bay, 
East Canyon , Rockport and Hyrum reservoirs was provided 
using the questionnaire found in Appendix A. Information 
concerning the parties ' origin, size and length of stay, 
type of vehicle(s) , type of boat , size of boat motor(s) and 
the percent of time spent in various activities was 
gathered . Previous questionnaires with similar objectives 
were used as sources for the questionnaire construction . 
Interviews 
Questionnaires were administered in two ways . The 
majority were gathered through personal interviews with 
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recreators as they visited each site. Approximately 20% of 
the questionnaires were gathered by Utah Department of Parks 
and Recreation (UPR) personnel. The latter method meant 
that only brief instructions were given to respondents . 
Sampling Procedure 
The target population consisted of those who recreate 
on the four selected Utah reservoirs . An effort was made to 
obtain a random sample of recreators from July through 
August on each site. However , since only one interviewer 
was employed, a completely random sample was not obtained 
for each reservoir. Effort was allocated with respect to 
reservoir size with Willard Bay receiving the most and Hyrum 
the least time . 
Data Biases 
Several factors affect the possible bias of the data . 
First , because questionnaires were taken only from July 
through August, no measurement of early (May- June) 
recreators was obtained . Second , the quality of the data 
differed because Rockport and East Canyon data were gathered 
to a great degree by UPR rangers who generally gave less 
personal attention to the project than did the interviewer . 
As a result, a percentage of the questionnaires from these 
sites were not filled out completely and were not useable. 
Third, only 20 observations were made at Hyrum, making the 
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results statistically unrep.resentative . The low number of 
observations was due to lesser number of survey days and 
unwillingness of recreators to fill out a questionnaire or 
be interviewed . Fourth, the assumption that the sample was 
an unbiased sample of the population could not be made 
because the samples were not gathered on random days or 
times . Finally, the size of some moto rs was gi~en in cubic 
inches. This required a conversion to horse power for 
comparability . This conversion may inject some bias into 
the on- site energy consumption figures . It is not known in 
which direction or to what extent these problems bias the 
results . 
Steps Taken to Mitigate Bias 
The percentages of recreators from different origins 
was computed from the samples. These were compared to the 
estimates made by UPR personnel . The two estimates were 
closely correlated , differing by no more than 3% for any 
origin and site except Hyrum . In that case, the sample 
listed Salt Lake City as the origin for 82% of the 
recreators. This compared to the UPR estimate of 10% from 
Salt Lake City and 66% from Cache County . Because so few 
observations were made at the Hyrum site , UPR personnel 
estimates were used in the analysis which follows . 
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Flaws in the Data 
After surveying was c ompleted , it was noted that t h e 
length of stay question had not been understood and/or 
filled in by many respondents. This made the quality of 
recreation variable inaccurate and negated any attempts at 
quantifying results . What foll o ws is an example of 
techniques used by energy analysts and economists using the 
flawed data . 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE ENERGY MODEL FOR FLAT WATER RECREATION 
The energy model used in this study to analyze energy 
costs of recreation on Willard Bay, Rockport, East Canyon 
and Hyrum reservoirs is the one developed by Clair Batty , 
David Bell and Thomas Stoddard (Stoddar d 1980). Recreation 
energy costs were broken down into two categories: travel 
energy expenditures (E1) and on - site energy expenditures 
(E2). 
This study uses gasoline consumption as a surrogate for 
total travel energy expenditures for two reasons : 
1) The calculations were made easier ; and 
2) The other energy costs , car wear and tear and oil , 
are small compared to gas consumed by cars in sample . 
Estimates of gasoline use for travel to each re servoir 
was found using the following equations : 
1 ) xl (mpgl) + .. xn (mpg n) = avg. mpg 
number of cars in sample 
when X n = # of car type n in sample and mpg n 
avg . mpg of n type car ; 
2) 0 1(m 1)+0 2 (m 2) ... +0 n (m 0 ) = miles 
traveled to site by sample recreationists 
when On is origin n and mn is miles from origin n to site ; 
3) # of recrea tion sam led on site 
of recreationists visiting in given year 
fraction . Thus; 
4) miles traveled to site by 
sample recreationists 
avg . mpg of cars in sample 
gallons spent traveling to site 
X 
fraction 
On Site Energy Expenditures (E2) 
E2 was assumed to consist o f gas used to power motor 
boats . This assumpti on was made because : 
1) Calculati ons were much simpler; and 
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2) Power boating is by far the largest energy consumer 
in flat water recr eation . 
The following equation was used by Tom Stoddard (1980) 
to find estimates of on site energy consumption . 
1 ) Summation of horse power 
in boat surveyed 
# boats surveyed 
2) # of boaters surveyed 
in sample 
# of boaters in year 
Average horse 
= power in boats 
sur veyed 
= fraction 
It was then assumed that boaters staying less than twelve 
hours spend 9/10 of their time boating and boaters staying 
longer than twelve hours spend 1 / 4 of their time boating . 
Therefore : 
3) 1 /4(# of long stay boats)(# of long stay hours) 
+ (9/1 0) (# shorter stay boats ) (# of short stay hours) x 
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X avg boat h.p . x gallons 
fraction boat hour 
gallons of gasoline used annually . 
Using the data gathered from on site questioning, E1 and E2 
were found for each reservoir . The energy consumption fig -
ures per visit ranked highest to lowest are in Table 2 . 
Table 2 . Sample recreational gas consumption at 
four Utah reservoirs 
1) East Canyon 40 . 79 gallons/visit 
2) Rockport 33 . 99 gallons/visit 
3) Hyrum 28 . 81 gallons/visit 
4) Willard 27 . 51 gallons/visit 
Usefulness of Energy Expenditure Method 
As was shown previously , use of energy analysis to 
evaluate projects other than those requiring energy effi -
ciency in the thermodynamic sense contributes no normative 
information because it fails to reflect the multiple 
objectives of human welfare and relative resourc e con -
straints . However, since energy efficiencies are 
analyzed by totaling energy costs and miles traveled is a 
proxy price for willingness to pay for recrea tion, the util -
ity of recreators is implicitly represented by this ranking. 
For example, because people expend more energy and thus 
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money at East Canyon than at Willard Bay, a case might be 
made that they enjoy it more; otherwise , they would spend 
less and go to Willard Bay. Energy expenditures in gallons 
of gasoline (Q) is directly related to the economic measure 
gross expenditures, i . e . , price times quantity of gasoline 
used (PQ) . The usefulness of the energy expenditures and 
g ros s expenditure methods will be discussed after the empir -
ical gross expendit~re example is presented in the economic 
model chapter . 
Energetics and the Energy Expenditure Rankings 
The ~nergy theory of value implies that energy should 
be conserved whenever possible . For this reason, energetic 
ranking of the reservoirs might list the smallest energy 
consumer per visit first, the largest last, that is: 
Table 3 . Sample energetic ranking of four Utah 
reservoirs 
1) Willard 27 . 51 gallons/visit 
2) Hyrum 28 . 81 gallons/visit 
3) Rockport 33 . 99 gallons/visit 
4) East Canyon 40.79 gallons/visit 
Thus, energetic rankings might contradict economic 
rankings that purport to measure consumer welfare. This 
ranking will be compared with the economic counterpart after 
these estimates have been developed . 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE ECONOMIC MODEL OF FLAT WATER RECREATION 
It is generally accepted that flat water recreation has 
value . The problem . is that public agencies often suppl y the 
facilities for flat water recreation . As a result, unlike 
most goods, this type of r ecreati on is not sold in markets 
that assign prices . Some have argued that flat water recre -
ation is p riceless . Unt i l recently , most planners have 
agreed with this argument and thus refused to measure its 
value . However , if it is accepted that whatever exists can 
be measured , the value of flat water recreation must have 
some definable quantity. The task , then , is to develop a 
theoretical framework for economic evaluation of flat water 
recreation and the associated empirical procedures . 
Economic Demand 
The basic demand principle is that the quantity 
demanded by consumers varies inversely with the price . At a 
low price , a large quantity will be demanded . At a high 
price , a relatively small quantity will be demanded . At a 
low price , a relatively large quantity will be co nsumed. 
Figure 6 is a typical linear demand cur ve for good X. 
Price of 
good X 
Demand curve 
Quantity demanded of 
good X 
Figure 6 . Typica l demand curve 
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Economic values measure how much people are willing to 
give up to enjoy a good or service . The concept is the same 
for marketed a s well as non - marketed goods , e . g ., flat water 
recreation . Consumers of any economic good receive satis -
faction equal to o r greater than the price they are willing 
to incur. Goods sold in markets cost consumers the market 
price plus the time and effort needed to make the trans -
action . These outlays regulate the amount of the good con -
sumed . Likewise , the monetary and time , e . g ., travel ; costs 
of a recreational activity will regulate how much recreation 
is consumed . In order to construct a flat water de mand 
estimate , an app r opriate money and time cost price must be 
determined . If these costs can be determined , then a 
statistical demand estimate can be made that is comparable 
to market priced goods . 
There are two cost related decisions that a recreator 
must make . First , in the long run he must decide whether to 
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buy recreational equipment of a fixed nature, e . g., jeeps, 
tents and boats that commit him to a specific type of recre-
ation . These costs, once incurred , do not affect the deci -
sion to recreate on any given day or at any given place. 
The second decision that a recreator makes is a short run 
decision. He must decide when and where to recreate . 
Important considerations in this case include time , travel 
and any on site costs that are incurred while recreating . 
These costs are valuable and affect the decision whether or 
not to participate in a particular recreational activity. 
These costs are thus the pertinent costs for surrogate pric -
ing of non-marketed goods in the short run. 
The economic model used in this study to assign values 
to recreation activities on the Utah reservoirs : Willard 
Bay , Hyrum, Rockport and East Canyon; is the travel cost 
model of Hotelling and Clawson . The simple model reviewed 
by Martin and Gum (1974) is employed to obtain demand 
curves. Consumed surplus is then calculated from the demand 
curves. The model makes three key assumptions (King and 
Davis, 1978, p . 28): 
1) Entry Fees: It is assumed that an individual would 
react to an increase in entry fees in the same manner as to 
an increase in travel costs ; 
2) Specification : The assumption is made that all 
relevant and statistically significant variables which 
affect trip - making behavior are properly specified in the 
travel cost model. Unde r this assumption , unbiased esti -
mates of the slope of the site demand curve may be found ; 
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3) Capacity Constraints : It is assumed that observed 
data points used to estimate the original model are true 
demand points. That is, there is no unobserved demand that 
goes unsatisfied . 
If for any given reservoir these assumptions are not 
true, then the re sults must be qual ified. It will be 
assumed that deviations fr om the above conditions occur 
equally on all sites . Therefore , since only a ranking is 
desired deviations need not be specified . 
The first step in the development of the model is to 
construct a demand function for the total recreational expe -
rience on a given reservoir . This is done by utilizing 
transportation cost as a surrogate for the true price of 
recr eation . Freeman (19 79) and Willig ( 1976) p rovide justi -
fication for using a single cost , e . g ., transportation 
costs; as a surrogate for true price of a good . The 
statistical demand cu rve is then one in which (transporta-
tion) costs are mapped against recreation measured in tr~ps 
to site as in Ffgure 7 . 
Transportation 
costs 
Visits to site per 1000 population 
Figure 7. Response curve for the recreational 
experience on a reservoir 
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The second step is to derive a statistical demand curve 
for the reservoir site itself from the response curve for 
the recreational experience. This is made possible by 
assuming that the recreators would react to changes in costs 
at the site , e . g ., entrance fees ; in the same manner they 
would react to changes in the costs of the recreation expe -
rience as a whole . The demand curve for the reservoir site 
is derived by relating posited added costs , e . g ., higher 
entrance fees ; to the number of visits that would occur at 
each higher pr ice . The resulting demand curve is in terms 
of added costs and total visits to the site ; that would 
occur at prices higher than the observed price , (see Figure 
8) . 
Added 
dollar 
costs 
Total visits rec r eational 
Figure 8 . Demand c urve for reservoir 
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The specific procedures of these steps are outlined in 
the empirical example which follows . 
Emp irical Exampl e 
The East Canyon rec r eational demand cu rv e is de r ived as 
an example . The costs of t r avel from each or i gin to East 
Canyon as assumed to be the same f o r eve r y visit from a 
given origin . The number of visits is put on a basis of per 
1 , 000 population from the origin ; see Table 4 . 
Table 4 . Sampl e demand for total rec r e a tional 
experience : East Canyon reservoi r 
Origin 
Morgan 
SLC 
Ogden 
Provo 
Cost 
$2 . 00 
$4 . 80 
$7 . 00 
$14 . 40 
Visits 
f r om 
or igin 
82 
6 , 566 
1 '313 
246 
Total visits to site : 8,207 
Vis i ts/ 
1 ' 000 
popula tion 
15 . 49 
9 . 38 
9 .1 2 
1 . 24 
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By plotting cost (column 1) against visits / 1, 000 population 
(col umn 4), a statistical demand curve for the total recrea -
tional experience is determined . This estimated curve is 
shown in Figure 9. 
Cost 
per 
trip 
Visits/1 , 000 population 
Figure 9 . Statistical demand curve for recreational 
experience East Canyon reservoir 
Next , an equation is found that gives the best fit to 
the data in Table 4 . Exponential , logarithmic and power 
functions were all tried . The power function y = AXB where 
A = 50 . 48; B = 1 . 2 and R2 = - . 89 fit the data best according 
to the R2 statistic . The demand equation visits = 50 . 48 
(travel cost) 1. 2 is then used to derive a demand curve for 
recreation on the reservoir in the following manner . The 
total projected number of visits is calculated at each 
posited increase in travel costs . (The fitted power func -
tion demand curve is used for this instead of Table 4 
because the t r avel cost increases are in $1 . 00 increments , 
making estimates of visits between the data points in Table 
4 necessary . ) 
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For example, by adding increments of $1.00 to the 
travel costs of the recreators from each origin, the corre -
spending projected number of visits can be determined by 
using the equation, V = 50 . 48 P - 1 · 2 Vis in visits per 1 , 000 
residents of the respondents origins . Therefore, in order 
to obtain total trips taken at each extra cost, the visits 
per 1,000 population must be multiplied by the number of 
thousand residents of each origin . The number of trips 
taken per each additional dollar cost is the sum of total 
visits projected from each origin at a given increase in 
cost. For example, Table 5 shows that at zero additional 
cost, a total of 6,557 trips ~o East Canyon are projected, 
and 116 from the Morgan area; 5,340 from the Salt Lake City 
area ; 697 from· Ogden and 404 from the Provo area . ) From 
columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 , a statistical recreational 
demand curve for a reservoir can be constructed (see Figure 
1 0) . 
The same curve fitting procedures were used and the 
best fit equation is the power function y ~ AX 8 where A = 
9948 . 88 B = - 0 . 8 R 2 = -. 97 . 
Travel 
cost 
Figure 10 . 
reservoir , 
189 5,290 
Numbe r of v isits 
Recreational demand for East Canyon 
Utah 
Consumer Surplus 
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Consumer surplus is the most accepted measure of r ecre -
ational values (Schuster and Jones 1982 )_ . It measures the 
surplus satisfacti on that a consume r receives from a commod -
ity above the price he had to pay for it. The central i dea 
is that consumers have a price they are willing to pay 
rather than do without the item . If a consumer pays less 
than he would be willing t o , he has incurred a surplus. For 
example , if the price of recreation in Figure 4 were z e r o , 
189 people would still be willing to pay $1 00 for the oppor -
tunity to recreate there. Hence, at the zero price, each of 
these 189 would be receiving a consumer surplus of $1 , 000 . 
If th e price is zer o for all consumers, then the total 
Table 5 . Sample projected visits from cities to four Utah reservoirs 
Morgan Salt Lake City Ogden Provo 
Pop . 5 , 300 Pop. 700 , 000 Pop . 144 , 000 Pop . 199 , 000 
Extra Total Visits/ Total Visits/ Tota l Visits/ Total Visits/ Total 
Cost Visits 1 , 000 Visits 1 , 000 Visits 1 , 000 Visits 1 , 000 Visits 
$0 6 , 557 21. 89 116 7 . 63 5 , 340 4 . 84 697 2 . 03 404 
$1 5 , 290 13 . 40 71 .6 . 07 4 , 252 4 . 13 534 1. 87 373 
$2 4 , 421 9 . 43 50 5. 01 3 ' 510 3 . 58 51 5 1 . 74 346 
$3 3 , 790 7 . 36 39 4 . 25 2 , 975 3 . 1 5 454 1. 62 322 
$4 3 , 310 5 . 85 31 3 . 68 2 , 573 2 . 81 405 1 . 51 301 
$5 2 , 932 4 . 91 26 3 . 23 2 , 260 2 . 53 364 1.42 282 
$6 2 , 629 4 . 15 22 2 . 87 2 , 010 2 . 30 331 1.34 266 
surplus of all consumers is measured by the area under the 
demand curve . In the case of East Canyon, we can integrate 
the fitted power functi on V = 19948.88 (T . C. ) - · 8 from 1 to 
100 . One and 100 are used instead of zero and infinity 
becaus e both va l ues represent 1 inflection point as the 
curve asymptot ically approaches the axi s . Therefore, esti -
mated consumer surplus for East Canyon is: 
V = 19948 . 88 T . C. · 2 }1~0 
= $7 5 '200 
Statistical de~and curves ana consumer surpl us estimates 
were de rived for Willa rd Bay , Rockport an d Hyrum in a simi -
lar manne r. Power func t ion (y = AXB) yielded best R2 fit 
for al l reservoirs. 
Cons ume r sur pl uses pe r visit ranked from highest to 
lowest are as follows: 
Table 6. Sample consumer surpluses for four Utah 
reservoirs 
1 ) East Canyon $9 .1 4/per visit 
2) Rockport $8 . 35/per visit 
3) Hyrum $6 .93 /per visit 
4 ) Hillard $6 . 35/per visit 
This ranking is the same as that derived previously with 
energy accounting techniques. It is the opposite of the 
probable energetic ranking . 
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Usefulness of Consumer Surplus 
A caveat about the use of consumer surplus estimates is 
required. First, consumer surplus is not comparable to mar-
ket price. If marketed and non - marketed goods are compared 
consumer surpluses should be found for both types of goods 
(Dyer and Hof 1979). Exceptions to this rule may occur when 
a single factor greatly influences consumption of a non-
marketed good which represents a large segment of the total 
supply, e.g. , as is the case of travel costs to a large res -
ervoir used for recreation (Binkley 1980). 
The Gross Expenditure Method 
The gross expenditure method sums the total cost to 
recreators participating in an activity . Gross expenditures 
on East Canyon are calculated as an example. 
The travel costs for a round tr ip are estimated from 
each origin by assuming that all recreators from that origin 
face the same travel expenses . The visits by origin are 
multiplied by an average cost for a round trip from that 
origin (Table 7). 
Next, on site expenditures (E 2) are estimated. Gaso -
line for boating is, in this example, considered the single 
on- site cost . Gasoline consumption on the four reservoirs 
is estimated in the energetic model chapter . The figure for 
East Canyon is 241 , 170 gallons, assuming a cost of $1.00 per 
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gallon, the total 1979 gross expenditure for East Canyon 
rese r voir recreation was $329 , 998 . 40 o r $40 . 21 per visit. 
Table 7 . Sample travel costs for East Canyon 
reservoir 
Total Visits 
Or igin travel from Tr a vel cost 
cost origin 
Morgan $ 4 . 00 82 $ 328 . 00 
Salt Lake 9 . 60 6,566 63 , 033 . 60 
Ogden 14 . 00 1 '313 18 , 382.00 
Provo 28.80 246 7 , 084 . 80 
Total travel c bst : $88 , 828 . 40 
Gross expenditures for the other reservoirs were esti -
mated in the same manner. The 1979 gross expenditures per 
visit on the four reservoirs, ranked first to last , were: 
Table 8 . Gross expenditure rankings of Utah 
reservoirs 
1 ) Rockport $41. 58 
2) East Canyon $40 . 21 
3) Hyr um $3 6. 02 
4) l~illard $30 . 24 
per visit 
per visit 
p e r visit 
per visit 
These rankings are nearly the same as those for expenditure 
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me t hod and consumer surplus , except Rockport and East Canyon 
a re reversed . However, if we assume a 10% error facto r , 
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there is no statistically significant difference between the 
Rockport and East Canyon estimates. The rankings are the 
inverse of the probable energetic ordering. 
The Usefulness of the Gross Expenditure Method 
The concept underlying the use of gross expenditures as 
a measure of value is that people receive values 
corrresponding to their recreational expenditures. Other -
wise, they would not make them. However, if recreation were 
abolished, most of the recreators' money would simply be 
spent on other goods and services . Economists contend that 
losses in satisfaction from a shift away from recreational 
goods would not equal gross expenditures . Thus, gross rec -
reational expenditures are not comparable with net economic 
benefits that would be estimated for the alternative uses of 
the resources . The energy expenditure method has the same 
deficiencies as gross expenditures because gross expendi -
tures are a function of energy expenditures. 
Comparison of Energy Accounting, Consumer Surplus, 
And Gross Expenditure Empirical Results 
The three methods used to find recreation costs, energy 
expenditures, consumer surplus and gross expenditures all 
yield the same rankings. Thi s is to be expec ted in the case 
of energy expenditures and gross expenditures . Both use 
analogous procedures, i.e . , a physical quantity (Q) as its 
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monBtary value (PQ) and the same data . Consumer surplus 
(CS) rankings should be the same as those of gross expendi -
tures since E = TC where E = expenditure and TC = travel 
cost and CS f(TC) assuming TC and f(TC) are positive and 
monatonic transformations. 
Thus, the three measures, energy expenditures, con -
sumer surplus and gross expenditures, should theoretically 
yield the same rankings. The energetic ranking should not 
be the same because the goal of energetics is to conserve 
energy or its corollary maximum output per energy unit 
expended . The explicit goal of economic welfare measures 
such as consumer surplus is to maximize human welfare . 
Human welfare often is a function of energy consumption . 
The goals of economic analysis and energetics may 
then be opposites and opposite rankings may result . 
Because the energy expenditure and gross expenditure 
methods have little theoretical basis supporting policy 
decisions, these methods are not recommended . The energetic 
rankings of energy expenditure utilizes the energy theory of 
value which is too narrow . Consumer surplus estimates with 
the appropriate caveats are recommended. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Traditional economics may not deal adequately with some 
problems of resourc~ allocation . Energy analysis has been 
suggested as a supplement or replacement for economics in 
resource problem areas. However, energetic methods are not 
superior to economics because: 
1) The energy theory of value is too narrow; 
2) Other materials also appear to be absolute 
constraints; 
3) Energetics does not lead to models that correlate 
well with re~lity ; 
4) Energetics does not lead to definitive conclusions 
on intergenerational resource allocation; and 
5) The energy numeraire is too narrow to address the 
wide range of human desires . 
The sample empirical results show that for the boating 
recreation study gross expenditures (the summation of PiQi) 
energy accounting methods (the summation of Qi) and consumer 
surplus (the integration of total costs) yielded the same 
project rankings with respect to recreation outlays. This 
was the expected result. Consumer surplus is the most 
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widely accepted method for evaluating willingness to pay for 
non-marketed goods . Rankings based on minimizing energy 
costs of recreation are the reverse of consumer surplus. 
Thus, if energetics were used as a policy tool, reservoirs 
with the highest consumer surplus (or utility) would be the 
least likely to receive funding and vice versa. The 
preferences revealed by consumer behavior are not consistent 
with minimizing energy costs and the associated energy 
theory of value . 
Energy accounting can add significantly to methods of 
efficient resource allocation if it is used to point out 
areas of potential increases in energy e·fficiency. Energy 
accounting per se has little normative significance . 
The study's empirical results could easily be improved 
by: 
1) Using full individual data as outlined by Martin 
and Gum ( 1 97 4) ; 
2) Reducing inherent biases in demand estimation as 
outlined by Beardsley (1971); 
J) Improving the sample ; and 
4) Improving the data gathering techniques . 
However, little gain would be expected by improvement 
of the empirical results since the question of the efficacy 
of energetics is based upon theoretical grounds . 
A critical re-evaluation of the theoretical 
underpinnings of this paper would be warranted if 
significant data revealed that individuals regarded energy 
availability (as stocks) as a direct argument in their 
utility function, rather than an input to the consumption 
process . · 
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APPENDIX 
~UTAH STATE DIVISION OF PAR KS AND RECREATION AND ~[E ~ UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY: USER SURVEY -
********************************************************** 
Name: 
Address: 
Phone: Boat #: 
Type of Vehicle (circle): Car (small, intermediate, full), 
Pickup, Van, 4-Wheel Drive, Motor Home 
Camping Equipment (circle): Tent, Camper, Trailer, Other 
Type & Size of Boat and Motors: 
inboard, inboard/outboard, jet, sail, paddle 
size of boat: size of motors : 
No. in party: ____ Time spent on site: 
Percent of time spent: fishing, skiing, boating 
=camping,= ORV, other 
\1ere other sites visited on this trip? Yes, No. If so, where 
What could we do to make your stay more enjoyable? (use back) 
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